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Note
THE CREDITOR AS A PARTICIPANT IN A
TENDER OFFER UNDER ITHE WILLIAMS
ACT
Recent allegations in litigation involving the Williams Act attempt to classify
thefinancier of the bidder-corporation as itself a bidder under the statute. The
author examines these arguments from the tactical point of view of subject com-
pany management and in light ofthepolicies underlying the statute. He concludes
that the best tactical andpolicy results can be achieved by demonstrating that the
creditor is a controlling person and a beneficial owner of the subject company's
securities while avoiding the dfficuly ofdemonstrating that the creditor has made
a tender offer.
IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED that the institutional lender
which finances a tender offer is "essentially a civilian among
combatants in a war zone."'  In the normal financing arrange-
ment, the creditor makes no entreprenurial profits from a success-
ful takeover attempt, and its only concern is to have the loan
repaid and its regular course of business uninterrupted.2 Increas-
ingly, however, the allegation has been raised in tender offer liti-
gation that the tender offer financier has itself become a bidder3
1. Potter, 7he Role of the Commercial Bank, Financing and Other Aspects of Cash
Tender Offers-A PANEL, 32 Bus. LAW. 1415, 1415 (1977).
2. Id
3. The term for the person who makes a tender offer was not defined in the Williams
Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(l)(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976),
as amended by Domestic and Foreign Investmen't Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 94-210, § 202, 91 Stat. 1498, but such a person is commonly referred to as the
"offeror." See, e.g., Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest
Analysis, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 613 (1970). The company whose stock is sought in the
tender offer has become known as the "target company." Id The SEC has announced the
following proposed rule 14d-l:
(a) the term "bidder" means any person on whose behalf a tender offer is
made;
(b) the term "subject company" means any issuer whose securities are
sought pursuant to a tender offer...
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-12,676 (August 2, 1976), reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 24,281A, at 17,715-7B.
Although these definitions have not yet been adopted, the Commission has adopted a
new filing form, Schedule 14D-1, for tender offers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978). In
the release, the Commission states that
[alithough the Commission is not adopting proposed Rule 14d-1 at this time, two
of the terms defined by that proposal, "bidder" and "subject company", are con-
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by obtaining control over the nominal bidder through burden-
some terms and conditions in the loan agreement.
An example of such an allegation appears in the complaint
filed by the plaintiff in a recent case.4 The tender offer was fi-
nanced by a group of banks pursuant to a participation agree-
ment. The subject company alleged that the loan agreement
imposes terms, conditions, negative covenants and other restric-
tions upon the bidder including but not limited to restrictions
upon the indebtedness of the bidder, which are so burdensome
and onerous that by reason thereof and by reason of the size of
the proposed indebtedness to the Participating Banks, both in
terms of amount, of percentage of [the bidder's] debt and of
relationship to stockholder's equity and by reason of the unusu-
ally high interest rate on the proposed loan, the Participating
Banks would have virtually absolute dominion and control
over [the bidder] and [the subject company] should the tender
offer be successful.
5
The complaint further alleged that by reason of this control rela-
tion, the banks became participants in the takeover attempt and
had failed to file the requisite disclosure statements.6
The allegation that a creditor has become a bidder by control-
ling its corporate debtor is raised primarily as a defensive maneu-
ver to defeat the takeover attempt. The subject company is
seeking an injunction based on the creditor's failure to make the
requisite disclosures.7 Even a temporary injunction for violations
of the itemized disclosure requirements of section 14(d)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19348 can thwart a takeover attempt.
tained in Instruction G to Schedule 14D-1. Since these terms are repeatedly
used in the Schedule, they were defined in the interest of clarity.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (July 21, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCI) 81,256, at 88,375. Since it appears that these terms
will be used by the Commission in future amendments, they will be used throughout this
Note.
4. Amended Complaint, Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, No.
76-4313 (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 20, 1976). For a related suit, see Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.
v. Congoleum Corp., 554 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1977) (suit against bidder to enjoin tender
offer). Litigation in both suits was dropped when the bidder abandoned the takeover at-
tempt.
5. Amended Complaint, Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 76-
4313, at 12, (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 20, 1976).
6. Id at 17.
7. For a discussion of injunctive orders in the context of tender offer litigation, see E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 281-83, 291-94
(1973) [hereinafter cited as E. ARANow & H. EINHORN]; E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G.
BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 126-37 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS].
8. 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) (1976).
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A delay in the consummation of the tender offer may allow time
for a rapid increase in the market price of the securities being
sought and may afford the subject company the time needed to
mount its campaign to defeat the takeover bid.9 Section 14(d)
was created to ensure that investors had the necessary information
on which to base an informed investment decision in response to
the tender offer."0 If the creditor is found to be a bidder, the sub-
ject company's suit will achieve this goal of investor protection as
a by-product by preventing the consummation of the tender offer
until the requisite disclosures have been made.
To establish that the creditor is a bidder, the plaintiff must
show that the creditor has "made a tender offer" and that, upon its
consummation, the creditor will become the beneficial owner of
more than five percent of any class of equity securities of the sub-
ject company." The first element presents the major stumbling
block from both an evidentiary and a conceptual viewpoint, be-
cause it is the debtor-corporation which has ostensibly extended
the tender offer.
The subject company's typical argument is that both elements
can be satisfied by establishing that the creditor controls the nomi-
nal bidder. Exactly what combination of creditor activities will
give rise to a control relationship is a question beyond the scope of
this Note. Such an inquiry might involve the examination of var-
ious creditor activities on a continuum of possible degrees of con-
trol, from activities which are associated with the usual loan
transaction to those which may give a creditor complete dominion
over the corporate debtor. Although not addressed in detail in
this Note, the factual determination of control is necessary before
the issues raised in this Note can be reached. 2 Since a wide vari-
9. "Where appropriate, legal action may be the surest method of bringing the offer to
a grinding halt and while such actions may serve only to delay the offer, the effect of such
delay may often be enough to assure the ultimate defeat of the offer." E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, supra note 7, at 266.
10. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813. In the legislative history of the Williams Act it is stated
that: "The bill would correct the current gap in our securities laws by amending the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for full disclosure in connection with cash tender
offers and other techniques for accumulating large blocks of equity securities of publicly
held companies." H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968), reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2814.
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) (1976).
12. For a discussion of control and the creditor's role in the corporate context, see
Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resultingfrom Improper Interference with the Man-
agement of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975); Enstam & Kamen,
Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289 (1968); Sommer, Who's "in Con-
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ety of elements may contribute to the many facets of the control
relation and to a finding of control, however, this Note will first
examine sections 13(d)' 3 and 14(d) 14 and their underlying policy
concerns to determine what kind of "control" the courts should
focus on when examining the allegation that a creditor controls
the debtor-bidder. 5 Next, the claim that the creditor can be char-
acterized as a bidder will be analyzed in more detail.16 After con-
cluding that such a characterization is not likely to succeed, this
Note will demonstrate that even without deeming the creditor a
bidder, simply establishing that a control relation exists, as the
subject company alleges, will achieve the policy of full disclosure
for investor protection and provide the subject company with an
effective defense tactic as well. 7 The finding that the nominal
bidder is controlled by the creditor may subject the latter to the
filing requirements of section 13(d)' 8and rule 13d-l(a)'9 after the
acquisition. Moreover, if the control relation is sufficient to make
the creditor a "controlling person," then the nominal bidder will
be required to disclose specific, itemized information concerning
the creditor in Schedule 14D-1.z ° The debtor-bidder violates sec-
tion 14(d) and possibly section 14(e)2 upon nondisclosure of the
required information and the creditor, as a controlling person, ar-
guably is vicariously responsible for this violation pursuant to sec-
tion 20(a).22 As a defensive maneuver, the subject company may
seek to enjoin the takeover bid based on the foregoing-violations,
while incidentally satisfying the policy of full disclosure.
trol? -- S.EC., 21 Bus. LAw. 559 (1966). See also Campbell, Defining Controlin Second-
ary Distributions, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rav. 37 (1976); Note, Particpation by Mutual
Funds in Corporate Takeovers, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1113 (1972); Note, The
Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 1007 (1973); Note, The Meaning of "Control" in the Protection of Investors, 60
YALE L.J. 311 (1951).
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-77).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
15. See topic I infra.
16. See topic Il-A infra.
17. See topic III infra.
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-77).
19. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,495 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1).
20. Schedule 14D-1, Instruction C, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978). See topic III-A
infra.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see note 219 infra and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); see note 225 infra and accompanying text.
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I. THE POTENTIAL FOR CREDITOR CONTROL
A. Creditor v. Equity Owner
The standard characteristics of debt and equity serve as a
frame of reference for the analysis of the issue of creditor control.
Courts will probably refer to these attributes as a standard from
which to judge whether creditor behavior deviates from the norm.
Although the appropriate factual criteria for determining control
are not developed in this Note, an understanding of the traditional
attributes of debt and equity helps demonstrate the kind of "con-
trol" which is the concern of sections 13(d) and 14(d).
One of the primary indicia of equity ownership is voting con-
trol.2 3 Shareholders typically exercise supervisory control by vot-
ing to elect the board of directors, the discretionary managers of
the corporation.24 A second characteristic of equity ownership is
the right to share proportionately in any net profits of the busi-
ness, although the decision whether to distribute such profits is left
solely to the directors during the operational phase of the corpora-
tion's existence.25 Finally, after all creditor claims have been sat-
isfied, to the extent sufficient assets remain, the shareholder has a
right to the return of his initial capital investment and his portion
of any accumulated profits.26 This third attribute is commonly
called "net asset"27 participation. Lenders, on the other hand,
"normally forego ownership rights and the opportunity for profit
in return for contractual obligations to pay fixed interest and prin-
cipal, in priority over stockholder's rights to profit and thus with
less risk."2 8 The obligation of the corporation to repay the princi-
pal and interest continues so long as there are assets remaining in
the business, regardless of whether the corporation is making
profits.29 Also in contrast to the rights of equity owners, creditors
do not participate in voting. 0
These packages of rights associated with debt and equity own-
23. See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 158, 170-188 (rev. ed. 1946).
24. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 33 (voting of shares), 35 (director manage-
ment of corporate affairs), 36 (shareholder election of board of directors), 39 (shareholder
removal of board), and 59(c) (shareholder vote to amend articles of incorporation).
25. See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 23, at §§ 158, 231-255.
26. See generally id at §§ 158, 301-319.
27. For a definition of "net assets," see MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 2(i).
28. Kamen, Special Problems of Institutional Lenders, Financing and Other Aspects of
Cash Tender Offers-A PANEL, 32 Bus. LAW. 1423, 1423 (1977).
29. See generally D. HERwrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 44-49, 291 (1966).
30. Id
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ership can be altered substantially by contract.31 Preferred stock
and convertible debentures are examples of the hybridization of
these rights.32  But absent any contractual alteration, the credi-
tor's claims and shareholder's rights will generally conform to the
standards set forth above.
After examining the major differences in the two parcels of
rights, one might conclude that shareholders, in exercising their
voting rights as owners of the corporation, control it to the exclu-
sion of the creditors. By examining the policy considerations of
sections 13(d) and 14(d), however, one can formulate a characteri-
zation of "control' that encompasses creditor as well as share-
holder activities.
B. The Williams Act
Sections 13(d) and 14(d) were enacted as part of the Williams
Act.33 Section 13(d) requires certain disclosures by persons who
"have acquired a substantial interest, or increased their interest in
the equity securities of a company by a substantial amount, [and]
within a relatively short period of time."' 34 Section 13(d)(1) states
in pertinent part:
31. See generally D. VAGTS, BASIC COPORATION LAW 94 (1973).
32. Id
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976), as amended by Domestic and
Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 202, 91 Stat.
1498. Three principal exemptions under § 13(d) exist for acquisition of beneficial owner-
ship of not more than two percent of a class of securities within a 12 month period, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(B) (1976); acquisition through a stock for stock exchange registered
under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(A) (1976); and for acquisition of
beneficial ownership prior to December 20, 1970, the date the five percent beneficial own-
ership threshold was adopted. By enacting § 13(g) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78m(g) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-1977), Congress gave the Commission the authority to
close these gaps in reporting beneficial ownership. See SEC Exchange Act Release No.
34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,571, at 80,301. The SEC has proposed rules pursuant to § 13(g) which would
impose disclosure obligations on these classes of persons who are exempted from § 13(d).
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,693 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in [Current Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,572 at 80,321.
Section 13(g)(l) can be read literally to apply to those persons who also may be under a
reporting obligation pursuant to § 13(d) or § 14(d); nevertheless, the Commission has the
authority to centralize reporting obligations, to avoid duplicative filings, and to minimize
compliance burdens as it deems necessary or appropriate. In recent proposed amendments
to Rule 13d-l pursuant to § 13(g)(l), the Commission has limited the applicability of
§ 13(g) to those classes of persons who are exempted from 13(d). Id Thus this section of
the Exchange Act is not directly relevant to a discussion of the financier of a tender offer.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2811, 2818.
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Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the bene-
ficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is regis-
tered pursuant to section 12 of this title . . . is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of
such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to
the issuer of the security. . . send to each exchange where the
security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement
containing. . . information, as the Commission may by rules
and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors .... 35
Thus, two key statutory requirements of section 13(d) are an "ac-
quisition" and the resultant "beneficial ownership." 36 A person is
deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership of securities "for
the purposes of section 13(d)(1) of the Act whether such acquisi-
tion was through purchase or otherwise. 37
Section 14(d) applies to a particular form of stock acquisi-
tion--the tender offer. It provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person. . . to make a tender offer
for, or a request of invitation for tenders of, any class of any
equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this
title . . . if, after consummation thereof, such person would,
directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5
per centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer
or request or invitation are first published or sent or given to
security holders such person has filed with the Commission a
statement containing such of the information specified in
§ 13(d) . . . and such additional information as the Commis-
sion may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.38
The key requirements that must be satisfied are, therefore, the
"making of a tender offer" and the resultant "beneficial owner-
ship" of securities.
Like section 13(d), section 14(d) is primarily an itemized infor-
mational regulation, 39  but it also imposes substantive,
noninformational restrictions on the terms of tender offers, pursu-
ant to the congressional determination that tender offers require
35. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-77).
36. See topic II-B infra.
37. Rule 13d-5(a), 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, at 18,497 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-5(a)).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
39. The rules adopted pursuant to these two sections require that the disclosure be
made in Schedules 13D and 14D-l, which must be filed with the Commission. 43 Fed.
Reg. 18,484, 18,499 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-100 (1978). The information must also be disseminated to shareholder-offerees.
Rule 14d-l(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d(c) (1978).
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special regulation for the protection of investors40 Tender offers
raise distinctive concerns because the shareholders of the subject
company are pressured to make quick decisions in response to the
tender offer, because the tendering offerees must keep their shares
on deposit for a fixed minimum period, and because the bidder
potentially has a superior ability to collect and assess information
about the subject company.4
These concerns manifested themselves in a variety of
noninformational provisions. Section 14(d)(5)42 provides with-
drawal privileges for shareholders, a freedom which they might
not otherwise enjoy if left only to the offer's contractual terms. If
the consideration offered for the shares is increased after some
shares have been tendered, section 14(d)(7)43 requires the in-
creased consideration to be paid for all shares purchased pursuant
to the tender offer, regardless of when they were deposited. In
some situations, the tender offer is made for less than all the out-
standing shares of a class. If more than the requested number of
shares are tendered, section 14(d)(6) 44 requires that they be
purchased pro rata (according to the number of securities ten-
dered by each shareholder).
As a practical matter, these substantive restrictions imposed
upon the terms of the tender offer itself are, arguably, inapplicable
to the "controlling creditor" even if such creditor is deemed a bid-
der as a result of the control relation. Since the creditor never
directly receives any shares and has no direct contact with the
tendering shareholders, these restrictions have no apparent appli-
cation to the controlling creditor's activities. The protections pro-
vided by sections 14(d)(5)-(7) will be afforded to the tendering
shareholders by the imposition of those terms on the debtor-bid-
der since only the nominal bidder makes the bid and physically
40. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968), reprintedin [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812-13. A "noninformational" securities regulation, as
that term is used by Professor Ronald J. Coffey, is one which "prohibits a course of con-
duct even assuming, and notwithstanding, the exertion of maximum efforts to prevent in-
formation failure in connection with such conduct." R. Coffey, Securities Regulation
Policy & Analysis 581a (1978) (unpublished multilith, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law). This contrasts with a disclosure regulation which is primarily "informa-
tional." See Coffey, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 268, 278-79 (1975).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2812, 2812; Coffey, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 268, 270
(1975); see note 82 infra.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
43. Id. § 78 n(d)(7).
44. Id. § 78 n(d)(6).
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receives the shares.45 Therefore, the noninformational policy
considerations of section 14(d), although applicable to the nomi-
nal bidder, are unsuited to an analysis of whether the creditor may
properly be deemed a bidder. Solely the informational aspects of
sections 13(d) and 14(d) are relevant with regard to the issues
presented in this Note.46
C. Control Under the Williams Act.
The predominant purpose underlying the enactment of the
Williams Act was to provide adequate disclosures in connection
with "acquisitions which [might] cause a shift in control."'47 The
standard of five percent beneficial ownership, which is common to
both sections 13(d) and 14(d), was adopted as an objective indica-
tor of stockholders with sufficient voting power to potentially shift
or influence control. The specific numerical percentage, however,
is essentially an arbitrary line beyond which the perceived poten-
tial for control is sufficient to justify imposing the burden of infor-
mational and-in the case of 14(d)-noninformational, statutory
compliance. The choice of a relatively small numerical percent-
age may indicate a congressional desire that "control" be broadly
construed for the purposes of section 13(d) and 14(d) acquisitions.
A distillation of the policy considerations underlying sections
13(d) and 14(d) is indispensable in attempting to determine the
type of control the drafters envisioned. Congress wished to
ensure that information concerning the circumstances surround-
ing potential or actual shifts in control would be available for in-
vestors to digest in deciding whether to sell, hold, or tender their
shares in response to a tender offer or some other attempted large-
scale acquisition of securities.48 The Williams Act "was designed
45. There may be some merit, however, for establishing creditor liability since volun-
tary compliance with the noninformational sections of 14(d) by the nominal bidder is en-
couraged by the application of those sections to persons within the scope of the. group
notion, § 14(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (1976). See note 124 infra and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, if the creditor is not found to be a bidder or to be within the scope of
§ 14(d)(2), the application of the noninformational regulations to the debtor-bidder satis-
fies the policy of investor protection.
46. In addition, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), an antifraud provision, is applica-
ble to the controlling creditor situation. See note 219 infra and accompanying text.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at
75. See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprintedin [Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,571, at 80,300.
48. "The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders who are
confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without
[Vol. 28:910
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to make the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair
opportunity to make their decision."4 9  Congress theorized that
the decision to retain or sell one's shares in the face of a large
acquisition of securities or in the context of a takeover attempt "is
in substance little different from the decision made on an original
purchase of a security . "... 0 The shareholder is essentially
faced with the decision whether or not to invest in a "new" secur-
ity.51
An investment decision typically involves a calculation of the
projected future stream of returns connected with the productive
activities of a corporation (the real asset projects) and the risk as-
sociated with those returns.5 2 The value of the investment is posi-
tively affected by increases in the present value of the projected
future returns and negatively affected by increases in the pro-
jected risk. If one assumes that an investor has a particular risk
preference for a given projected stream of returns, changes in the
real asset projects, which affect the projected risks and returns,
will affect the value of the investment and might be inconsistent
with the shareholder's investment preferences. The disclosure of
information concerning persons with the ability to alter or influ-
ence the real asset projects of the corporate enterprise therefore
"facilitate[s] the valuation and choice of investments in terms of
their risk-return components. .... -53
If the preceding analysis of the investor decisionmaking pro-
cess is correct, then one way to characterize the kind of control
which the creditor must acquire in order to fit within the policy
concerns of sections 13(d) and 14(d) is the ability to alter the real
asset projects or to influence those who have such ability. The
persons most likely to possess such ability are the managers and
shareholders of the subject company.5 4 It is by influencing the de-
cisions made by these two groups with respect to the productive
adequate information ...." Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
The Supreme Court has stated further that "[t]he legislative history. . . shows that the
purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with a
tender offer." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
49. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968), reorintedin [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813.
50. Id
51. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250, 1257 n.41 (1973).
52. See generally Hagaman & Jensen, Investment Value andSecurityAnalysts, FINAN-
CIAL ANALYSTS J., March-April 1977, at 63.
53. Coffey, supra note 41, at 277.
54. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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activities of the corporate enterprise that a creditor can be said to
"control" the corporation. This characterization is supported by
the general definition of control in the Exchange Act" which has
been made expressly applicable to Schedule 13D:56 control is
"the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise.""7  Control is undefined for the purposes of section
14(d). This may be attributable to technical oversight when
Schedule 14D-1 was extracted from Schedule 13D as a separate
disclosure mechanism.58 One could argue, however, that Con-
gress and the SEC intended to allow the concept of control to ex-
pand, in the context of section 14(d), on a case-by-case basis. If
so, the general definition59 could be viewed as the narrowest con-
cept of control in the Exchange Act, leaving open the possibility of
more comprehensive interpretations in those settings where policy
concerns indicate it is appropriate. It is possible, therefore, that a
court might formulate a broader definition of control in the tender
offer context. Because a tender offer is an overt tactic for acquir-
ing control, it is reasonable to place a heavier burden of compli-
ance on persons involved in such transactions by expanding the
definition of control. Merely the potential for control exists in
connection with section 13(d) acquisitions;60 it seems justifiable to
impose a heavier burden of compliance on those who make for-
mal tender offers as opposed to those who have merely purchased
a large block of securities in the open market or by private trans-
action.
Section 13(d)(1)(c), 61 which is also applicable to tender offer
acquisitions pursuant to section 14(d)(1),62 provides further sup-
port for characterizing control as the ability to alter the real asset
projects of a corporation. This section requires the disclosure of
the following information:
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1978).
56. Id § 240.12b-1. No similar regulatory provision exists regarding Schedule
14D-1.
57. Id § 240.12b-2(f) (emphasis added).
58. See note 77 infra.
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1978).
60. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972).
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-77).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1).
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[I]f the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchase is to
acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities,
[the bidder must disclose] any plans or proposals which such
persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or
merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major
change in its business or corporate structure.63
Such plans clearly may affect the risk-return components of the
shareholder's investment by altering the risks and expected re-
turns associated with the productive operations of the subject
company.64
D. Creditor Control
The managers and shareholders of the subject company are in
a position to alter or influence decisions concerning the corpora-
tion's real asset projects. 65 The creditor's ability to dictate or in-
fluence their decisions must be sufficient to have a significant
impact on the risk-return components of the shareholders' invest-
ments in order to meet the policy concerns of sections 13(d) and
14(d). A remaining question is how a creditor may achieve such
influence merely by financing a successful tender offer.
A creditor's investment decision to loan funds involves risk
and return aspects much like those of an equity owner.66 One
major difference, however, is in the risk associated with the invest-
ment. A creditor is paid so long as there are sufficient assets re-
maining in the corporate asset pool.67 Since the fixed return on
the creditor's investment is not dependent upon the profits of the
debtor's business, the risk-return components of the creditor's in-
vestment may be less affected by changes in the real asset projects
of the corporation. The priority of the creditor's claim over those
63. Id (emphasis added). Consistent with these policy considerations, the Commis-
sion may exempt acquisitions "not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the
effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not compre-
hended within the purposes of this subsection." Id § 78m(d)(6)(D).
Item 5 of Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978), further supports this char-
acterization of "control" by requiring information concerning the bidder's plans or propos-
als which relate to or would result in:
[a]n extraordinary corporate transaction . . . [a] sale or transfer of a material
amount of assets. . . [amny change in the present board of directors. . . [a]ny
material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy [and]... [a]ny
other material change in the subject company's corporate structure or business
Id
64. See generally Coffey, supra note 41, at 271-78.
65. See note 24 supra.
66. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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of the shareholders also reduces the impact that changes in the
productive operations of the debtor-corporation may have on the
creditor's investment.68
Tender offer loans are usually unsecured because of the enor-
mous amount of money necessary to consummate a tender offer
and because of the creditor's desire to avoid violations of Regula-
tion U. 6 9  With no collateral involved, the creditor must rely on
the returns generated by the debtor's business for repayment of
both principle and interest. In addition, upon default on the loan,
the creditor has no security to satisfy the debt and will share the
assets with other general creditors. Consequently, the creditor
frequently protects its investment through the use of negative and
restrictive covenants in the loan contract.7" Such provisions might
require the maintenance of a certain debt-equity ratio to insure
the availability of assets to satisfy the debt upon default.7 In or-
der to ensure the solvency of the debtor so that it can meet the
loan payments, the creditor might similarly restrict the payment of
dividends, the sale of assets, and the incurrence of future indebt-
edness.72 If the viability of the debtor-corporation depends upon
the expertise of existing management, the creditor might provide
for acceleration of the loan upon any change in managerial per-
sonnel.73 This discourages such changes and may operate to give
the creditor a veto power over officer appointments.74
The acquisition of the subject company by the debtor-bidder is
likely to involve some major change or expansion of the debtor's
business. To the extent that an increase in risk or a change in the
projected future stream of earnings is expected, the creditor may
wish to provide for contingencies and protect against hazards as-
sociated with the debtor-bidder's relationship with the subject
68. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
69. 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1978) (adopted pursuant to § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976)). The margin requirements of Regulation U apply to bank
loans to purchase stock which are directly or indirectly secured by a stock pledge, and they
limit the loan value of the secured stock to a certain percentage of its market value. For a
discussion of Regulation U and tender offers, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note
7, at 41-45; DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 62, 160-63; Schwartz & Kelly, Bank Financ-
ing of Corporate Acquisitions-The Cash Tender Offer, 88 BANKING L.J. 99 (1971). See
also Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975); Potter, supra
note 1, at 1415-22.
70. Enstam & Kamen, supra note 12, at 320-22; Potter, supra note 1, at 1423.
71. Enstam & Kamen, supra note 12, at 321.
72. Id
73. See Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 12, at 345; Enstam & Kamen, supra note 12, at
322; Kamen, supra note 28, at 1424.
74. Enstam & Kamen, supra note 12, at 322.
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company after the tender offer is consummated. The debtor-bid-
der will be a shareholder of the subject company upon consum-
mation of a successful tender offer, and it is likely that it will be in
a position to exercise substantial supervisory control.75 Thus the
creditor may be in a position to alter the real asset projects of the
subject company by placing restrictions on the debtor's future
activities. Furthermore, if the debtor-bidder has sufficient power
to elect a majority of the board of directors, the creditor may an-
ticipate the debtor's control of the future managers of the subject
company and place additional contractual limitations on the
debtor.
It is evident, therefore, that the creditor may be able to influ-
ence the decisions of the debtor-corporation, which, in turn, may
possess the ability to alter the real asset projects of the subject
company. If this influence in itself is sufficient to alter the risk-
return components of the tendering shareholder's investment, then
the creditor's activities seem to fall within the policy concerns of
section 14(d).76 This is especially true where the creditor acquires
some discretionary influence through the terms of the loan con-
tract. While it is not within the scope of this Note to explore the
varied elements which might contribute to a finding of control
and the many facets of the control relation, it would seem that a
combination of contractual terms must exist before the creditor
would be deemed to have the ability to control the debtor-bidder
and, through it, the subject company. The controlling creditor
argument could succeed if sufficient facts were adduced to show
the relationship in fact existed, and, given the expansive policy
underpinnings of sections 13(d) and 14(d), the claim should not be
taken lightly nor be dismissed as frivolous.
II. THE CREDITOR AS A BIDDER
A person who has made a tender offer for a class of equity
securities which will result in the beneficial ownership of more
than five percent of the securities of such class is subject to the
disclosure requirements of section 14(d).7 7 The major difficulty
75. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
76. See topic I-C supra.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). Pursuant to § 14(d), the Commission adopted rule
14d-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1978). This rule was recently amended and now reads:
No person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
otherwise, shall make a tender offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of,
any class of any equity security which is registered pursuant to section 12 of the
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in characterizing the creditor as a bidder is establishing that it has
"made a tender offer." The debtor-bidder ostensibly extends the
tender offer while the creditor merely finances the transaction.
Even if the creditor cannot be deemed a bidder, it is subject to the
disclosure requirements of section 13(d) if it becomes a beneficial
owner of more than five percent of a class of securities of the sub-
ject company through financing a successful tender offer.78
A. The Making of a Tender Offer
The term "tender offer" is somewhat misleading. The party
making the bid does not offer to tender his shares; rather, he in-
vites the shareholders of the subject company to do so.79 The
statutory use of the term tender "offer" led to the use of the terms
"offeror" and "offeree" to describe the parties involved in such
transactions.8 0  As these terms suggest, a tender offer can be ana-
lyzed using traditional contract notions. If a tender offer is essen-
tially a contract, then one might argue that a person must be in
contractual privity with the tendering shareholders to be charac-
terized as a bidder. Since the creditor does not deal directly with
the shareholders, the contractual privity requirement must be sat-
isfied by showing that the creditor is a party to the tender offer
contract which exists between the debtor-bidder and the tendering
shareholders.
Act. . . if, after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly,
be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class, unless, at the
time copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given
to security holders, such person has filed with the Commission a statement con-
taining the information and exhibits required by Schedule 14D-1.
Id This amendment accompanied the adoption of Schedule 14D-I. See note 3 supra.
Prior to this amendment, Rule 14d-I required the filing of information and exhibits re-
quired by Schedule 13D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1976). The Commission adopted Sched-
ule 14D-1 to take effect at the same time as certain amendments to Schedule 13D, in order
to avoid requiring bidders to make two transitions, Le., changing over to the amended
Schedule 13D and later to Schedule 14D-1. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,787
(July 21, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 81,256, at 88,372. The Commission has announced its intention to amend all of the rules
under § 14(d)(1) in the future with the exception of Schedule 14D-1. Id "The adoption of
the schedule is part of the Commission's plan to replace its emergency rules under the
Williams Act with a comprehensive regulatory framework with respect to tender offers."
Id (Schedule 13D was subsequently amended again in SEC Exchange Act Release No.
34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 81,571, at 80,299).
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-77); see topic I-B infra.
79. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 69 n.18.
80. See, e.g., Bromberg, supra note 3.
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1. The Tender Offer Contract
Tender .offers generally give rise to contractual obligations,
with the terms of the contract being set by the bidder. Comment-
ing on "[t]he status of tender offers under contract law," Aranow
and Einhorn state that:
In most instances, tender offers are conditional offers to
purchase securities. The acceptance takes place when the
shareholder commits himself to tendering his shares ....
While the use of the term "invitation for tenders" [in section
14(d)] implies that the person seeking to purchase the securities
is requesting the shareholder to make an offer, the terms and
conditions of the invitation normally suggest otherwise. Thus,
whether called "an offer to purchase" or an "invitation for ten-
ders," it is the purchaser who is actually making the offer and
not the shareholder and a binding contract is created when the
shareholder tenders his shares in accordance with the terms of
the offer.8 1
Since the purpose of most tender offers is the quick seizure of con-
trol, the bidder wants to impose precise conditions on the
purchase, such as the tendering of sufficient shares to gain control
before the bidder is obligated to purchase at all.8 2 As Aranow and
Einhorn assert, most tender offers involve contractual promises.
The applicability of contractual analysis has been raised in liti-
gation concerning tender offer contracts. In a dispute related to
the unsuccessful tender offer made by Gulf & Western Industries,
Inc. to shareholders of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tqa Company,
Inc.,83 offerees who had responded by tendering their shares sued
the subject company, which brought the successful suit to enjoin
the tender offer, for interference with their contractual rights and
the bidder for failure to consummate the tender offer.8 4 While
81. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 69 n.18 (emphasis added).
82. See Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Commerce andFinance of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (statement of Manuel
F. Cohen, Chairman of SEC):
A tender offer is quite different from the ordinary market transaction with which
the average investor is familiar. In so far as it is an offer at all it is subject to
complex and sometimes deceptive conditions. Rather it is an invitation to the
public security holder who 'tenders' his security to give the other party an op-
tion--to be exercised only if certain minimum shares are tendered within a speci-
fled time and perhaps specifying a maximum which the original 'offeror' is
prepared to take-but giving his discretion to accept a lesser or larger amount or
to extend the time limits.
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 74 n.28.
83. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (tender offer enjoined for alleged antitrust
and securities law violations).
84. Lowenschuss v. Kane, 367 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'don other grounds,
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expressly leaving the question open, the lower court suggested that
tender offers are really "solicitations of offers" and that a contract
arises only when the bidder accepts the tendered shares.85 The
court of appeals held that a contract did exist,86 dismissing the
lower court's suggestion that a tender offer is merely a "solicita-
tion of offers" as a "misreading of Williston."8 In support of its
position, the appellate court quoted the following excerpt from
Williston:
The terms of the offer generally state that holders of a specified
number of shares, or a stated percentage of the stock outstand-
ing, shall agree, before a set date, to sell their stock to the pur-
chaser for a certain price. Acceptance by the owners of the
requisite number of shares, in accordance with the terms of the
offer, is the condition which must happen before the duty of
payment, i.e., of immediate performance, arises. Upon theful-
fillment of the condition, however, the contract is binding and
enforceable.88
The opinions expressed by Aranow, Einhorn, and Williston sup-
port the proposition that tender offers generally are contractual,
but the issue of whether a person must be in contractual privity
before a tender offer is deemed to be made has not been squarely
addressed by the authorities.8 9
Exactly what constitutes a tender offer has been the subject of
considerable controversy. Two significant approaches to devel-
oping a working definition have surfaced in recent years. One the-
520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975) (the subject company and its officers and directors were dis-
missed from the action by stipulation).
85. 367 F. Supp. at 914 n.4.
86. 520 F.2d at 265. Having found disputed issues of material fact, the court of ap-
peals reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case.
87. 520 F.2d at 265 n.9. This tender offer did not contain a "litigation-out" clause
typically inserted by the bidder to relieve it from its obligation to purchase the tendered
shares if, before the time of purchase, litigation arises relating to the tender offer. Similar
clauses may be inserted to excuse the bidder from performance should other adverse events
occur. Id at 260 n.3.
88. Id at 265 (quoting 8 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 948C, at 152 (3d ed. 1964)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
89. It has been suggested that "legislative drafters do not reflect upon the basic con-
tractual structure of the typical bid. . . . [and that] [miuch remains to be done in working
out the fundamental contractual framework of tender offers, particularly in view of the
many points of interaction between statutes and traditional contract theory." Coffey,
supra note 41, at 281-82.
The "attempt . . . to dispose" language in § 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 broad-
ens the scope of the purchaser group beyond contractual offerees, for example, in the appli-
cation of § 5(c) to "attempt[s] . . . to dispose" during the prefiling period. See 1 Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 181 (2d ed. 1961). The absence of such language in § 14(d)(1),
(e.g., "attempt to aquire") suggests that the scope of the bidder group is limited to con-
tractual offerors. See Coffey, supra note 41, at 287.
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ory, suggested by Aranow and Einhorn, relies on objective
indicators to determine the existence of a tender offer, such as the
number of solicitees and the publicizing of the tender offer.90
Rather than expanding the definition of "tender offer" to include
privately negotiated purchases and open-market transactions,
these commentators would restrict it to more traditional notions of
what constitutes a tender offer.9 A second approach is to include
within the meaning of tender offer those acquisition schemes
which "exert the same sort of pressures on shareholders to make
uninformed, il-considered decisions to sell which Congress found
the conventional tender offer was capable of exerting,"92 in addi-
tion to those embraced within the traditional notion.
Implicitly, each approach recognizes or should recognize the
existence of contractual privity as a necessary ingredient of a
tender offer. At the very least, some sort of direct relationship
must exist between the bidder and the tendering shareholder as
buyer and seller. The legislative history supports the proposition
that contractual privity is a necessary component of a tender offer.
The House Report concerning the Williams Act stated that:
The cash tender offer has become an increasingly favored
method of acquiring control of publicly held corporations. The
offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to
buy shares of a company-usually at a price above the current
market price. Those accepting the offer are said to tender their
stock for purchase. The person making the offer obligates
himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered
shares if certain specified conditions are met.9 3
The use of these contractual terms indicates the legislative drafters
viewed contractual privity as an essential element of a tender of-
fer.
Furthermore, one of the factors that contributes to the pressure
surrounding tender offers is that the bidder imposes conditions,
particularly time limitations, on the offer.94 The offer may be
such that the bidder need not purchase any shares unless a mini-
mum number of shares are tendered. Meanwhile, the tendered
shares must be kept on deposit without any guarantee that they
90. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 1-25.
91. Id at 1-25, 52; see Coffey, supra note 41, at 285-88.
92. Note, supra note 51, at 1275.
93. H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. N-ws 2811, 2811 (emphasis added).
94. See notes 41 & 82 supra and accompanying text.
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will be purchased. Thus, the contractual nature of tender offers
was one of the evils Congress sought to regulate. Sections
14(d)(5)-(7) were intended to control what Congress viewed to be
some of the possible undesirable consequences of unregulated
freedom to create the contractual terms of the tender offer.9"
The removal of the contractual privity requirement would ex-
tend the scope of the tender offer regulations far beyond what
Congress intended. A hypothetical illustrates this point. Suppose
someone asks to represent a group of shareholders in regard to a
corporate matter. Assume further that the surrounding circum-
stances are such that the shareholder is pressured to make a quick
and uninformed decision in response to this offer. The share-
holders are, therefore, being asked to relinquish some of their su-
pervisory powers9 6 in a pressured situation. Depending on the
nature of the corporate matter, the representative might obtain the
power to alter or influence decisions affecting the real asset
projects of the corporation, resulting in a change in the risk-return
components of the shareholders' investment.97 As with a tender
offer, this situation, if left unregulated, could permit the unin-
formed, pressured transfer of a portion of the shareholders' power
over management, allowing another person to acquire the ability
to affect the investment value and associated risk of the security.
The shareholders are, in a limited sense, making a new investment
decision by merely acceding to the request and then holding their
shares. Is the simple request to represent the shareholders on
some corporate matter a tender offer? It seems to fit the policies
of section 14(d)98 and, absent a requirement for contractual privity
with respect to this transfer of power, such a characterization is
not unimaginable. Of course, this hypothetical extremely attenu-
ates the conventional notion of a tender offer. But, absent con-
tractual privity as a limiting factor on the notion of a tender offer,
it is difficult to distinguish such a case merely by reciting the pol-
icy concerns surrounding tender offers.
95. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
97. See topic I-C supra. Cf. 1 Loss, SECURrTIEs REGULATION 461 (2d ed. 1961)
(committee seeking proxies to represent stockholders on certain corporate matters may be
an offering of securities in certain circumstances).
98. See id.
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2. Contractual Privity
Assuming one can establish that contractual privity is a neces-
sary ingredient of a tender offer, the next task is to establish
whether a creditor financing the offer may also be deemed to be in
contractual privity with the tendering shareholders. In the typical
financing transaction, the creditor does not directly deal with the
shareholders, but merely lends funds to the nominal bidder.
Thus, the creditor must be shown to be a party to the debtor-bid-
der's tender offer contract in order to satisfy the requirement of
"making of a tender offer."
Ostensibly, the creditor is not a party to the tender offer con-
tract. There is no communication between the creditor and the
shareholders which might serve as the basis for an implied agree-
ment. Absent additional facts extraneous to the financing agree-
ment, there is no basis for finding the mutual assent required to
create a legally binding obligation.99
If the creditor is a bank, the tender offer regulations allow for
the name of the bank to be kept from the shareholders upon re-
quest, further indicating that by merely financing the tender offer
the creditor is not intended to be a party to the contract. Sched-
ule 14D-1 provides that:
If the source of all or any part of the funds to be used in the
tender offer is a loan made in the ordinary course of business
by a bank as defined by section 3(a)(6) of the Act, the name of
such bank shall not be made available to the public if the per-
son filing the statement so requests in writing and files such
request, naming such bank, with the Secretary of the Commis-
sion.100
That the subject company shareholders need not learn of the iden-
tity of the bank is also indicated by the instruction to Item 11 of
Schedule 14D-1 which states that, in filing the loan agreement as
an exhibit, "[tihe identity of any bank which is a party to a loan
agreement need not be disclosed if the person filing the statement
has requested that the identity of such bank not be made available
to the public .... ,101 This illustrates that the security holders
99. See J. MuRRAY, CoNTRAcrs §§ 17-20 (rev. ed. 1974).
100. Schedule 14D-1, Item 4(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978). A similar provision
applicable to Schedule 13D filings is found in § 13(d)(1)(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1)(b)
(Supp. Pamphlet 1972-77). Aranow and Einhorn observed, prior to the adoption of
Schedule 14D-1, that this provision would "permit purchasers to omit the name of
lender(s) in tender offer soliciting materials ... and in the Schedule 13D statement sent to
the issuer." E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 7, at 97 n.88.
101. Schedule 14D-l, Item 11(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
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who receive notice of the tender offer pursuant to rule 14d-l(c)(4)
may not learn of the bank's identity.10 2  If the creditor's identity
can be kept confidential, it seems unlikely that the Commission
perceived it to be a party to the contract.
In some financing arrangements, the creditor may be deemed
to be in control of the debtor-bidder. 0 3 If the control is such that
an agency relationship is established, then the creditor would be-
come a party to the contract."° The definition of a bidder as a
person "on whose behalf a tender offer is made"105 seems to en-
compass a principal whose agent makes a tender offer on its be-
half.
It is unlikely, however, that the control relation alone will
yield an agency relationship. The control relation arises through
the operation of the loan contract terms designed to protect the
creditor's investment. '06 But this contractual type of control does
not support the inference that the creditor has given actual author-
ity'07 to the debtor-bidder to make the tender offer on its behalf,
and the mere financing of the tender offer seems insufficient to
establish apparent authority. 108 It is conceivable that the creditor
can achieve some measure of control over the debtor-bidder, but it
seems almost inconceivable that it would desire that the tender
offer be made on its behalf as a principal. However, if the cir-
cumstances of an individual case are such that an agency relation
is found to have been established, then the contractual privity re-
quirement will be satisfied and, under the familiar doctrine of the
undisclosed principal, the nondisclosure of the creditor's identity
will make no difference."°
Merely controlling a bidder, short of establishing an agency
relationship, will be insufficient to satisfy the contractual privity
requirement. In this situation, the creditor is in a position analo-
gous to a parent company whose subsidiary has made a tender
offer. 110 The parent company will not be responsible for its sub-
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(c)(4) (1978).
103. See topic I-D supra.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 7 (1957).
105. Schedule 14D-1, Instruction G(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978); see note 3
supra.
106. See topic II-D supra.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 7, 26, 144 (1957).
108. Id §§ 8, 27, 159.
109. Id § 186-193.
110. "A 'parent' of a specified person is an affiliate controlling such person directly, or
indirectly through one or more intermediaries." Rule 12b-2(k), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(k)
(1978), made applicable to § 13(d) by 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-1 (1978). This definition is not
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sidiary's tender offer contract absent a basis for "piercing the cor-
porate veil." '' Similarly, concerns of adequate disclosure to
investors and a sufficient, pressure-free opportunity to make an
informed investment decision are adequately served by existing
regulation, without imposing separate liability on the creditor for
the debtor-bidder's tender offer contract. Schedule .14D-1 al-
ready requires disclosures concerning a creditor who is a con-
trolling person. 1 2 In addition, the application of the
noninformational sections 14(d)(5)-(7) to the nominal bidder af-
fords investors time to intelligently weigh the control relationship
in their investment decisions.' 1 3
Furthermore, by requiring certain disclosures to be made by
the nominal bidder concerning controlling persons," 4 Schedule
14D-1 seems to distinguish between the bidder and controlling
persons, adding additional support to the assertion that "control"
alone will not make the creditor a party to the tender offer con-
tract. One example of the definitional separation between con-
trolling persons and bidders is Item 9, which requires certain
bidders to disclose their financial statements. Item 9 states "[that
if the bidder is controlled by another entity which is not a natural
person and has been formed for the purpose of making a tender
offer, [the bidder must] furnish current, adequate financial infor-
mation concerning such parent.""' 5 Moreover, in Instruction C to
Schedule 14D-l, the bidder must disclose the information re-
quested in several of the items in the schedule as to controlling
persons." 6 It also states that "[a] response to an item in the state-
ment is required with respect to the bidder and to all other per-
sons referred to in this instruction unless such item specifies to the
contrary.""' Thus, apparently the SEC did not intend the term
bidder to subsume all controlling persons.
While apparent distinctions are drawn between the bidder and
controlling persons, a strict adherence to the statutory scheme
expressly made applicable to § 14(d) filings, see generally notes 55-:60 infra and accompa-
nying text, but presents some guidance as to a possible characterization of "parent" for the
purposes of § 14(d).
111. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 Tx. L. REv. 979, 991-93 (1971).
112. Schedule 14D-l, Instruction C, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978); see topic III-A
infra.
113. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
114. Schedule 14D-l, 17 C.F.1. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
115. Id
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
117. Id (emphasis added).
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does not conclusively support such a dichotomy. One is required
to file a Schedule 14D-1 only if one is subject to section 14(d)" 8
and Rule 14d-1." 9 The statute and rule merely make it unlawful
for any person to make a tender offer without compliance, and do
not expressly exclude controlling persons from the scope of the
statute. The filing schedule simply enumerates the information
required to be disclosed by those persons who are subject to the
statute and rule. Thus, it is not certain that the apparent dichot-
omy drawn in Schedule 14D-1 between controlling persons and
the bidders prevents a person who controls a bidder from himself
being deemed a bidder. 20  One must, therefore, fall back on the
arguments that control alone will not bring the controlling person
into contractual privity with the tendering shareholders, and that
the policies of section 14(d) do not justify deeming a controlling
person to be a bidder.
Neither is the apparent dichotomy clarified by examination of
the term "bidder" itself. At first blush, it appears that the defini-
tion of a bidder could be read expansively, and that the phrase
"on whose behalf a tender offer is made" could include persons
who control the nominal bidder and who stand to benefit indi-
rectly if the tender offer is successful.' 2 ' However, a comparison of
this definition with proposed rule 14d-2 2 2 shows that it contrib-
utes little to the analysis of who may be characterized as a bidder.
Rule 14d-2, proposed as a replacement for the existing rule 14d-1,
states in pertinent part:
No bidder shall make a tender offer for any class of securities
referred to in Section 14(d)(1) of the Act if, after consummation
thereof, such bidder would, directly or indirectly, be the benefi-
cial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class of the sub-
ject company's securities unless simultaneous with or prior to
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1978).
120. Certain language in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (July 21, 1977), re-
printedin [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,256, at 88,371, leads
one to believe that Instruction C makes controlling persons "subject" to the disclosure re-
quirements of Schedule 14D-1. For example, it states that "Instruction C was intended to
clarify and to curtail, as far as feasible, the additional persons who would be subject to the
disclosure requirements of Items 2-7 . I..." d at 88,374 (emphasis added). Despite sev-
eral references to the proposition that Instruction C makes controlling persons subject to
the disclosure requirements, the apparent misleading use of terms is clarified by the stipu-
lation that the "burden of compliance [is] placed on the bidder." Id
121. Schedule 14D-1, Instruction G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978); see note 3 supra.
122. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-12,676 (August 2, 1976), reprinted in 2 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,282A, at 17,715-12.
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the time the tender offer is first published, sent or given to se-
curity holders, such bidder
(1) files or has filed. . . a tender offer statement .... 123
When the definition of a bidder is added to proposed rule 14d-2,
it reads: "'No person on whose behalf a tender offer is made' shall
make a tender offer." This graphically demonstrates the absence
of any substantive content to the term "bidder."
Finally, if the creditor can be shown to dominate the debtor-
corporation completely, then it could be argued that the creditor
and the debtor are one entity. This extreme form of control
would seem to bring the creditor into contractual privity with the
tendering shareholders. Unless the debtor-bidder is merely a
shell corporation created for the purpose of disguising the fact that
the creditor is the true bidder, it seems highly unlikely that a cred-
itor could exact such burdensome contractual terms to acquire this
extreme degree of control.
3. Group
If the creditor and the debtor-bidder can be characterized as
acting as a "group" for the purpose of making a tender offer, then
the creditor can be characterized as a bidder. Sections 13(d)(3)
and 14(d)(2) state that "when two or more persons act as a part-
nership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring,
holding or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or
group shall be deemed a 'person' .... 14 The concept of the
group is especially important in tender offer situations since
persons who ... make tender offers frequently act with allies
such as other security holders, banks, andfinanciers. Thus it is
to be expected that persons who seek to oppose such ... tender
offers will attempt at the outset to determine whether two or
more persons involved in the ... tender offers own in the ag-
gregate, more than 5 percent of the target's securities.125
The group concept can be used to aggregate the securities al-
ready held by different individuals in order to meet the numerical
percentage test. 126 A group can also exist for the purpose of ac-
quiring securities.127 Since a tender offer is a means of securities
acquisition, the formation of a group for the purpose of making a
tender offer establishes the "making a tender offer" requirement
123. Id
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(3), 78n(d)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
125. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 40-41 (emphasis added).
126. Id
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(3), 78n(d)(2) (1976).
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of section 14(d) for each member of the group even if only one
member actually makes the tender offer.
Section 14(d)(2) may lend itself to two interpretations, each
having different consequences for the notion of contractual priv-
ity. On one hand, it might be argued that since a person must be
in contractual privity with the tendering shareholders in order to
be characterized as a bidder, each individual member of the group
must be in contractual privity in order for section 14(d)(2) to ap-
ply. A more plausible interpretation of section 14(d)(2) is, how-
ever, that the entire group is statutorily responsible for each
member's actions which are pursuant to the agreement. Thus, if
one member makes a tender offer, the group as a whole is respon-
sible for the tender offer whether or not each member is in con-
tractual privity with the tendering shareholders. Without section
14(d)(2), such non-bidder members might still be parties to the
tender offer contract if the acting member were an agent for the
group, or if the members were intended beneficiaries of the con-
tract.128 Arguably, the group notion was intended to extend the
application of section 14(d)(1) to those situations where the mem-
bers of the group might otherwise not be covered.
Aranow, Einhorn, and Berlstein assert that an actual, overt
agreement by two or more parties to act in concert is necessary for
a group to exist.129 However, if "overt" implies that direct evi-
dence of an agreement is necessary, this proposition has not been
accepted by all courts. In one recent decision, 30 the court relied
on circumstantial evidence in support of a finding of a "group."
The court found a "shared purpose" evidenced by "contempora-
neous declarations" by two persons as to their individual purposes
and decided that the persons involved had "tacitly agreed" to act
as a group.' 3 1 This is inconsistent with the notion that an overt
agreement is necessary; however, courts have seemed to require
that an "actual" agreement be found. 32
128. See notes 103-09 supra and accompanying text. See generally MuRRAY, supra
note 99, at §§ 276-288 (contract beneficiaries).
129. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 41; Gf Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366
F. Supp. 374, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (agreement to act in concert required).
130. Universal Container Corp. v. Horwitz, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,161, at 92,242 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also General Aircraft Corp. v.
Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (Ist Cir. 1977).
131. Universal Container Corp. v. Horwitz, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,161, at 92,254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
132. "There must be agreement to act in concert." Id at 92,254 (quoting Texasgulf,
Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1973)).
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The legislative history seems to suggest that something less
than an overt agreement satisfies the policy considerations of sec-
tions 13(d)(3) and 14(d)(2). In discussing section 13(d)(3), it is
stated that "[t]his provision is designed to obtain full disclosure of
the identity of any person or group obtaining the benefits of own-
ership by reason of any contract, understanding, relationshp,
agreement or other arrangement."'133 The language used in the
legislative history seems to encompass more than "overt agree-
ments."
Aranow, Einhorn, and Berlstein note that:
Whether or not such an agreement has been made can be in-
ferred from the circumstances of the particular case. A party
that has contributed no funds and no advice, has furnished no
support for activities undertaken by other members of the al-
leged group, and has done nothing more than that which would
be required to represent its own interests, should not be found a
member of a group. Where a party has engaged in one or
more of the described activities, it is probable that the party has
created or joined a partnership, syndicate or other group within
the meaning of Section 13(d)(3).' 34
Although made in the context of discussing the requirement of an
"overt agreement," this statement seems to better capture the
spirit of the "group" notion as described in the legislative history.
Depending on the surrounding circumstances, the financing of a
tender offer might indicate the existence of an "understanding, re-
lationship, agreement or other arrangement ' 135 that meets the pol-
icy concerns of section 14(d)(2). The creditor and debtor-bidder
are, in one sense, acting with the common purpose of "making a
tender offer," with the creditor supplying the funds for the ven-
ture. If the creditor also obtains sufficient control to raise the pol-
icy concerns of section 14(d), 136 a court might be willing to hold
that the creditor and bidder have formed a group. However, if
the court adheres to the requirement of an overt agreement, it
would be very difficult for the court to fimd that a group had been
formed. Thus, the group notion might not provide enough lever-
133. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2818 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the legislative history
notes that §§ 13(d)(3) and 14(d)(2) are identical, indicating the comment applies to both.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2811, 2820.
134. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 41 (emphasis added).
135. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1968), reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2818.
136. See topic I-C supra.
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age to surmount the obstacle of showing contractual privity on the
part of the creditor; i e., that the creditor has "made a tender of-
fer."
B. The Creditor as a Beneficial Owner
Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies
only to certain bidders-those who will become the beneficial
owners of more than five percent of a class of the subject com-
pany's securities if the tender offer is successful. It may be easier
to conceptualize and prove this second prerequisite to the invoca-
tion of section 14(d)(1) than it is to show that, despite contractual
privity problems, a tender offer has been made. Acquisition of
more than five percent beneficial ownership of a class of securities
triggers the operation of section 13(d) even absent a tender of-
fer.1 37 Beneficial ownership alone, therefore, creates duties to dis-
close itemized, material information pursuant to policy
considerations quite similar to those of section 14(d).138 Noncom-
pliance equally provides the basis for a defensive suit.' 39 Also,
the contractual control relation, 41 which establishes beneficial
ownership, triggers disclosures concerning the creditor in the
debtor-bidder's Schedule 14D-1 statement. Therefore, the policy
and tactical considerations served by showing that the creditor is a
bidder can be served equally well by merely demonstrating the
control relation and without showing that the creditor has made a
tender offer.
1. Beneficial Ownershop-Rule 13d-3.
Beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class of the
subject company's equity securities is the crucial factor that will
determine whether the creditor is subject to section 13(d) and the
137. Rule 13d-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,495
(1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a)) states in pertinent part:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of
any equity security of a class which is specified in [rule 13d-l(c)], of the Act is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than five percent of such class
shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security...
to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a
statement containing the information required by Schedule 13D.
Acquisition of more than five percent beneficial ownership of a class of equity securities
may also trigger the operation of§ 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (Supp. Pamphlet 1972-1977);
see note 33 supra.
138. See topic I-C supra.
139. See topic III-B infra.
140. See topic I-D supra. See also topic III supra (violations for noncompliance).
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second element required to subject the creditor to a section 14(d)
filing obligation. Prior to the adoption of rule 13d-3, 14 1 the pri-
mary indicia of beneficial ownership was consistently held to be
"voting control." 142 Rule 13-3 broadens the former definition to
include "investment power," stating:
a beneficial owner of a security includes any person who, di-
rectly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, under-
standing, relationship, or otherwise has or shares:
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to
direct the voting of, such security; and/or
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose,
or to direct the disposition, of such security ....143
Rule 14d-l(g) t44 applies this definition of beneficial ownership to
tender offer transactions. It seems consistent with the common
policy concerns of sections 13(d) and 14(d) to apply a single defi-
nition of beneficial ownership.1 45 Beneficial ownership is an ob-
141. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,496-97 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3).
142. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 112 (7th Cir. 1970); Stirling v. Chem.
Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975).
143. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,496-97 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13-3(a)).
Rule 13d-3 was amended in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), re-
printed in [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CC-I) 1 80,980, at 87,575, to
take effect in August 1977. However, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,844 (August
10, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CC-I) 181,274, at
88,414, postponed the effective date of rule 13d-3 until April 30, 1978. In SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 13-900 (August 29, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,297, at 88,466, the Commission solicited comments on rule 13d-3.
It stated that "[a]lthough the Commission is not proposing to amend the new [rule] at this
time, it is requesting public comment with respect to the objections raised by institutional
investors in order to assure that its regulatory actions are fully responsive to the public
interest." Id at 88,466-67. Finally, the Commission amended rule 13d-3 as well as the
rules and schedules under § 13(d) in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21,
1978), reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,571, at 80,299.
Although the definition of beneficial ownership is substantially unchanged, the Release
rescinded the previously adopted Schedule 13D-5 and replaced it with a new short-form
acquisition statement, Schedule 13G, primarily for the benefit of institutional investors.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(g) (1978). Rule 13d-3, though postponed with regard to
§ 13(d) acquisitions, became effective for the purposes of rule 14d-l(g) on August 31, 1977.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,844 (August 10, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 81,274, at 88,415. For the purposes of
§ 13(d), "[a]ny person may on a voluntary basis choose to rely upon the new and amended
beneficial ownership [rule]... during the interim from September 1, 1977 through April
30, 1978." Id at 88,415. Since the most recent amendments to rule 13d-3 left the defimi-
tion of beneficial ownership substantially unchanged, no further mention of rule 14d-l(g)
was made in the Release. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978),
reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 1 81,571, at 80,299.
145. See topic I-B, C supra.
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jective indicator of the capacity to change or influence control of
the subject company. 4 6  Information concerning persons poten-
tially able to alter the asset projects of the corporation is material
to a shareholder's investment decision to retain or sell his shares
in the face of a potential or actual shift in control.'47
The rule 13d-3 reference to "investment power" considerably
broadens the reach of sections 13(d) and 14(d) and is consistent
with the policy concern that circumstances surrounding shifts in
control be disclosed.148  Though lacking the authority to vote the
shares, a person with dispository power may place voting power in
the hands of a new owner who will vote the shares differently. 149
In addition, where the voting and investment rights of a security
146. See topic I-C supra.
147. The general antifraud provisions of § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), require
disclosure of material information in connection with tender offers. See note 219 infra
and accompanying text. Aranow, Einhorn, and Berlstein assert that a court should use the
same definition of the term "material" as the Supreme Court applied for the purposes of
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1978): "an omitted fact is material if there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote [here, making an investment decision]." DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 57
(quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (emphasis omitted)).
148. See topic I-C supra. Additionally, beneficial owners include "persons with the
right to acquire beneficial ownership at any time within sixty days through the exercise of
an option, warrant, conversion of a convertible security, or pursuant to the power to revoke
a trust." DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 38. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291
(Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
T 80,980, at 87,575; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprintedin
[Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,571, at 80,309-10.
In the recent amendments to rule 13d-3, the Commission added the proviso that if the
acquisition of a security (or power to acquire a security in one of the above mentioned
forms) is "with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer, or
in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect,"
then such person shall be deemed the beneficial owner of the securities immediately upon
such acquisition (without regard to the 60-day time period). 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,497
(1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i)). A person with the right to ac-
quire beneficial ownership within 60 days by means of the "automatic termination of a
trust, discretionary account or similar arrangement" is also deemed a beneficial owner.
Id Another device of rule 13d-3 that broadens its scope is subsection (b), which includes
as beneficial owners those who attempt to evade the reporting requirements by a "plan or
scheme" which divests them of beneficial ownership or prevents the vesting of beneficial
ownership from taking place. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-3(b)).
149. "[T]he power to vote inheres in the security and may be relocated in the hands of
any person to whom the holder of the power to dispose wishes to sell. Thus, the holder of
the power to dispose potentially has the ability to bring about the rapid shift in control at
which Section 13(d) is aimed even though he does not have the power to vote or to direct
the voting of the security." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978),
reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,299, at 80,309.
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reside in different persons, as with a voting trust arrangement, 5 0
the concern may be that eventually these two packages of rights
could be reunited under the control of one person. It is impor-
tant, therefore, that both be disclosed as beneficial owners, even
though only one has voting control. A final assumption underly-
ing the inclusion of "investment power" within the definition of
beneficial ownership may be a presumption that any person with
the power to dispose of the security also has some influence over
how the stock is voted.151
Finding a controlling creditor to be a beneficial owner is con-
sistent both with the policies of sections 13(d) and 14(d) and with
the language of rule 13d-3. The power to vote or dispose of se-
curities, as well as the ability to direct such voting or disposition,
may arise "directly or indirectly," through any "contract, arrange-
ment, understanding, relationship, or otherwise."' 52  Further-
150. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,980 at 87,582 (example 5 of
selected illustrations of the application of rule 13d-3).
151. "Investment power" also suggests other policy underpinnings for §§ 14(d) and
13(d) beyond the disclosure of potential shifts in control. The statutory language of these
sections seems to support the existence of other policy concerns by allowing the Commis-
sion to require disclosure of information as it deems "necessary or appropriate in thepublic
interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. Pamphlet
1972-77); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1976) (emphasis added). Section 13(d)(6)(D) seems to
admit the existence of such additional policy concerns by allowing the exemption of acqui-
sitions which do not have the "effect [of] changing or influencing the control of the issuer
or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(6)(D) (1976) (emphasis added).
An additional support for the existence of policy concerns other than those relating to
shifts in control is that acquisitions of beneficial ownership in a class of nonvoting stock, by
purchase or pursuant to a tender offer, seem to fit the letter of the statute but not the policy
of revealing shifts in control. For the purposes of § 13(d), however, the Commission re-
cently re-defined "equity security" to exclude "securities of a class of non-voting options,
warrants, rights, convertible debt or convertible preferred securities." 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484,
18,496 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(c)). This definition has not been
made applicable to the rules under § 14(d). An example of an additional policy expressed
by the Commission is the disclosure to the public of the "location of rapidly accumulated
blocks of stock, even though they have been acquired not with the purpose or effect of
changing or influencing control .. " SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April
21, 1978), reprinted in [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,571, at 80,302. The
rationale is, perhaps, to advise investors of those persons with sufficient holdings to affect
the value of the issuer's stock by selling large blocks of the securities or by rapidly buying
up more stock. There is also evidence of a congressional intent to provide for the disclo-
sure of foreign ownership of domestic corporations. See SEC Exchange Act Release No.
34-14,692, reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,571, at
80,309. Although the "control" policy is of particular concern for the purposes of this Note,
the existence of additional policy underpinnings of §§ 13(d) and 14(d) arguably suggests
that "beneficial ownership" should and will be broadly construed.
152. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,496-97 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)).
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more, rule 13d-5(a) states that beneficial ownership "shall be
deemed to [be] acquired . . . whether such acquisition was
through purchase or otherwise."'53 Thus, a creditor's ability to, di-
rectly or indirectly, direct the voting or disposition of the subject
company's stock upon consummation of the tender offer by opera-
tion of the loan contract would constitute beneficial ownership.
In addition, the use of the terms "directly or indirectly" and
"contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or
otherwise," when coupled with the broad policy concerns of sec-
tions 13(d) and 14(d), 154 suggests that the language "power. . . to
direct"' 55 will be expansively construed. The Commission has
stated that:
An analysis of all relevant facts and circumstances ... is es-
sential in order to identify each person possessing the requisite
voting power or investment power. For example, for the pur-
poses of the rule, the mere possession of the legal right to vote
securities under applicable state or other law. . . may not be
determinative of who is a beneficial owner of such securities
inasmuch as another person or persons may have the power
whether legal, economic or otherwise to direct such voting.156
Thus, although the debtor-bidder ostensibly has the power to vote
or dispose of the acquired securities, the creditor may contractu-
ally place restrictions or burdens on the debtor which effectively
give the creditor the power, "whether legal, economic or other-
wise," to "direct" such voting or disposition.
The "selected illustrations" of rule 13d-3 which the Commis-
sion has provided indicate that it contemplated the application of
the beneficial ownership provisions to lending institutions, includ-
ing banks.'5 7  In example 6,158 the trust department of a national
153. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,497 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(a))
(emphasis added).
154. See topic I-C supra.
155. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,496-97 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)).
156. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 80,980, at 87,578 (emphasis added). "[There
may be multiple beneficial owners of the same securities when two or more persons share
voting or investment power over such securities or when such powers reside in different
persons." Id at 87,577-78. Thus, the fact that the debtor-bidder becomes a beneficial
owner will not preclude the creditor from becoming a beneficial owner of the same securi-
ties. Rule 13d-l(b) was amended in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 to permit a
single Schedule 13D to be filed when more than one beneficial owner exists for the same
securities. However, the beneficial owners could file separately if they so choose. Id at
87,578. In the most recent amendment, this provision was placed in rule 13d-l(e). SEC
Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) [ 81,571, at 80,307.
157. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977
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bank was vested with "voting and/or investment power" in more
than five percent of the securities of a particular corporation pur-
suant to unrelated trust agreements. The Commission stated that
the national bank has a filing obligation since under rules
13d-3(a) and 13d-3(c) 5 9 it was a beneficial owner of more than
five percent of a class of securities. Although the bank in the ex-
ample acted pursuant to its trust powers and not its lending pow-
ers, the example serves as an indication that the Commission or a
court might extend the application of rule 13d-3 to creditors who
possess sufficient "voting or investment" power to constitute bene-
ficial ownership. Since the beneficial ownership rule has only re-
cently been adopted and amended, the limits to its applicability
are unclear.1 60  However, by examining some of the examples set
forth in the release accompanying the adoption of rule 13d-3,1
6 1
one can determine how creditor control might give rise to benefi-
cial ownership.
In the examples, rule 13d-3 is assumed to be in effect and the
securities of Z Corporation (the subject company) are registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.162
The release provides two modes of analysis for demonstrating that
the creditor can become a beneficial owner. The first is to estab-
lish that by controlling the debtor-bidder, the creditor indirectly
controls the acquired subject company stock. In example 2, Y, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of X Corporation, acquires beneficial
ownership of six percent of the shares of Z Corporation.163  The
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,980, at 87,581-85. Although rule 13d-3
was amended in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in
[Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,571, at 80,299, the definition of
beneficial ownership in rule 13d-3(a) was unchanged. Therefore, the descriptive examples
in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,980, at 87,575, are still relevant.
158. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,980, at 87,583.
159. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,496 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a),(c)).
160. Although the term "beneficial ownership" is also used in § 16 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), its treatment in that context is not instructive. The recent
definition of beneficial ownership "has been adopted primarily for the purposes of Section
13(d).. . [and] the new rules are not intended to affect interpretations of the provisions of
Section 16 of the Exchange Act, or the rules and regulations thereunder, since the purposes
of Section 16 are different from those of Section 13(d)." SEC Exchange Act Release No.
13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,980, at 87,576.
161. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,980.
162. Id at 87,582.
163. Id
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Commission states that both X and Y are beneficial owners of Z's
securities. 64 The apparent policy concern is that the parent can
control the stock, either directly by liquidating the subsidiary, or
indirectly through its controlling influence over the Y Corporation
directorate. A creditor might similarly enjoy indirect beneficial
ownership of the subject company's securities which the debtor-
bidder acquires pursuant to the tender offer. The creditor argua-
bly possesses the ability to direct the voting and disposition of the
securities by restricting the actions of those who possess the voting
164. "X's obligation to report such ownership may be satisfied with a filing by either X
or Y. If Y corporation files on behalf of X and Y, the control position and the other
information required with respect to X must be disclosed pursuant to Instruction C to
Schedule 13D. If X Corporation files on behalf of X and Y, it must disclose that it is
indirectly the beneficial owner of the Z shares as a result of its control over Y Corporation,
which actually holds the shares." Id
The Commission further states in this example that if X meets the conditions of rule
13d-5 (which has since been deleted from Regulation 13D), including (a)(2)(ii), it may
satisfy its reporting obligation by filing a Schedule 13D-5. Id; rule 13d-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-5 (1977) (rescinded April 21, 1978). Rule 13d-5 allows certain institutional in-
vestors (such as broker-dealers, investment companies, and banks) who acquire more than
five percent of a class of securities in the ordinary course of business and without the intent
or effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer, nor in connection with such a
transaction, to file an abbreviated acquisition statement on a quarterly basis in lieu of filing
a Schedule 13D. "Congress specifically provided in Section 13(d)(5) that the Commission
could permit the filing of a short form acquisition notice in lieu of the more detailed Sched-
ule 13D which is primarily aimed at obtaining information about potential changes in con-
trol of an issuer." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,980, at 87,579.
In the most recent amendments to Regulation 13D, the Commission rescinded the old
Schedule 13D-5 and adopted a new short-form acquisition statement for institutional in-
vestors, Schedule 13G. "The essential requirements of old Rules 13d-I . . . and 13d-5
• . . [were] included in new Rule 13d-l so that a person may look to a single rule to
determine whether he has a reporting obligation and if so, how that obligation may be
satisfied." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in [Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,571, at 80,301. Schedule 13G is avail-
able only for certain kinds of institutional investors, as enumerated in § 13d-(l)(b)(1)(ii).
43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,495 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(1)(ii)). Fur-
thermore, "Schedule 13G may be used by a specified institutional person only when such
person is acquiring and holding securities in the ordinary course of business, and not with
the purpose or with the effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer, or in connec-
tion with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect." SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-14,692 (April 21, 1978), reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,571, at 80,303. Almost by definition, it would seem that the
financier of a successful tender offer would be prevented from using Schedule 13G for
beneficial ownership acquired in connection with the tender offer transaction, because such
transaction has the purpose or effect of changing or influencing control of the subject com-
pany. Also, the acquisition of beneficial ownership by controlling the debtor-bidder is
seemingly not what is contemplated by the "ordinary course of business" requirement of
rule 13d-l(b)(1)(i). 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, at 18,495 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-l(b)(1)(i)).
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power, the managers of the debtor-bidder. 6 As the creditor's
contractual rights more closely resemble equity ownership of the
debtor-bidder, the analogy to a parent company becomes more
persuasive. Since the distinctions between debt and equity can be
easily blurred by contract,' 66 a court might be willing to accept
this analogy to a parent company as support for a finding of bene-
ficial ownership.
A creditor might also become a beneficial owner by contractu-
ally acquiring direct control over the acquired subject company
securities. 67 In example 5, the Commission posits a situation
where X Corporation "acquires 52% of a class of securities of Z
Corporation and simultaneously establishes a ten year voting trust
naming Y as trustee with the power to vote on all ordinary corpo-
rate matters.16 8  X's retention of the power to direct the disposi-
tion of the Z shares is sufficient to make it a beneficial owner, and
Y's power to vote the stock makes it a beneficial owner of the
same securities.' 69 Similarly, example 7 deals with the acquisi-
tion of an irrevocable proxy by a bank giving rise to beneficial
ownership. 170  Example 2171 illustrates that a creditor's right to
acquire control of the subject company's securities by an exercisa-
ble put, option, warrant or right, or convertible security will result
in beneficial ownership.172  These situations cover the obvious ac-
quisitions of beneficial ownership that are, however, unlikely to
occur in tender offer financing due to the common practice of ex-
tending only unsecured loans so as to avoid the application of
Regulation U.173 It is also unlikely that the debtor, who made the
165. See topic I-D supra. The risk-return components of the security may be affected
by this exercise of creditor control. Id
166. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
167. Most relevant to the secured creditor is the provision of rule 13d-3 which excludes
from the definition of beneficial ownership certain persons whose only interest in the secur-
ities is that of a pledgee in the ordinary course of business pursuant to a bona fide pledge
agreement. The exemption is available only to persons qualified to file a Schedule 13G
and provided that the pledge agreement is not entered into "with the purpose or with the
effect of changing or influencing issuer control." 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,497 (1978) (to be
codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(d)(3)). The financier of a tender offer might have diffi-
culty meeting one or both of these criteria. Moreover, in the usual tender offdr financing
arrangement the loan is unsecured, making this provision inapplicable. See note 69 supra
and accompanying text.
168. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,291 (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in 11976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. T 80,980, at 87,583.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id at 87,582.
172. Id at 87,578.
173. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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tender offer to gain control, will be willing to give up its newly-
acquired power in such a direct manner.
2. Group
A creditor may also become a beneficial owner of securities if,
along with the debtor-bidder, it has formed a "group for the pur-
pose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities."' 74 In the
context of section 13(d) acquisitions, the group notion triggers dis-
closure requirements by persons whose individual holdings are
below the requisite percentage but whose aggregate holdings meet
the statutory threshhold. 17' The argument in favor of using the
group notion to supply the element of beneficial ownership neces-
sary to subject the creditor to section 13(d) or 14(d) is similar to its
use in the analysis of the element of the "making of the tender
offer.' ' 76  Even though the creditor does not individually enjoy
beneficial ownership of any of the subject company's securities, if
it and the debtor-bidder have formed a group for the purpose of
acquiring the shares of the subject company, then the group itself
beneficially owns the requisite percentage of securities (assuming
that the bidder acquired more than five percent of a class of eq-
uity securities pursuant to the tender offer). In this situation, the
bidder acquires beneficial ownership through the consummation
of a successful tender offer, and the creditor acquires beneficial
ownership by reason of an agreement between it and the debtor-
bidder to act in concert, holding and exercising the rights appurte-
nant to the acquired securities. Thus, even without acquiring
control over the debtor-bidder, the creditor can become a benefi-
cial owner of the subject company's stock.
One might argue that the creditor would be unable to exact
such an agreement without possessing the capability for control-
ling the debtor-bidder, but, theoretically, control is not necessary
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (1976); see topic II-A(3) supra.
175. Two leading cases were in conflict as to whether an agreement to hold securities is
sufficient for the formation of a group, or whether the parties must agree to further acquire
securities. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); see E. ARANOW & H. EIN-
HORN, supra note 7, at 83-93. Rule 13d-5(b) adopts the former view that the group ac-
quires beneficial ownership of securities upon the date of the agreement though the group
has made no subsequent purchase or agreed to purchase additional securities. 43 Fed.
Reg. 18,484, 18,497 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2811, 2818.
176. See topic II-A(3) supra.
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for the formation of a "group." '17 7 This argument returns to the
same question of whether an overt agreement is required by sec-
tion 14(d)(2). 178 A further problem is whether a group will be
found to exist where only one member of the group beneficially
owns the subject company's securities as an individual. This lat-
ter problem does not present an insurmountable obstacle. If the
policy concern behind the group notion is that individuals are act-
ing in concert with respect to the securities, this concern exists
whether one or all members beneficially own some of the class of
equity securities involved. If the debtor-bidder is acting pursuant
to an agreement between it and the creditor, disclosures solely by
the holder of the securities will not suffice, since the creditor has
influence over the voting and disposition of the stock as a member
of the group. 179
III. DISCLOSURE OF CREDITOR CONTROL IN BIDDER'S
SCHEDULE 14D-1
A. Requirement for Disclosure
If a creditor acquires control over the debtor-bidder, both this
relationship and information concerning the controlling creditor
must be disclosed by the bidder in Schedule 14D-1.180 The in-
structions to Schedule 14D-1 state that when a statement is filed
by a corporation, the information required by Items 2-7 must be
given with respect to "each person controlling such corporation
",181
Clause (b) [of Instruction C] requires disclosure of all persons
controlling the bidding corporation which includes any corpo-
ration ultimately in control of the bidding corporation. In
multiple corporate structures, e.g., where one or more layers of
controlling coporations [sic] exist between the bidding corpora-
tion and the corporation in ultimate control, clause (b), among
other things, requires identification and disclosure concerning
the corporations in the mid-tier corporate structure. 182
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (1976).
178. See notes 129-136 supra and accompanying text.
179. Rule 13d-3, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,496 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-3).
180. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
181. Id This provision is similar to Instruction C to Schedule 13D, which bidders filed
prior to the adoption of Schedule 14D-1; see note 77 supra.
182. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (July 21, 1977), reprinted in [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,256, at 88,374. The instructions also call
for disclosures by each director and executive officer of the bidder-corporation and each
executive officer and director of any corporation in control of the bidder-corporation.
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Disclosures are required of an affiliate in a mid-tier corporate
structure only if it is actually in control of the bidding com-
pany.18
3
If control by a creditor were deemed analogous to parent com-
pany control, 184 Instruction C would seem to require disclosure of
the relationship fact and of a substantial amount of information
concerning the controlling creditor. This provision is arguably in-
tended to deal with the situation where a subsidiary has made a
tender offer in which the parent company might not be deemed a
bidder (because of the contractual nature of tender offers) absent
some reason for piercing the corporate veil. 185 Furthermore, the
parent company need not be subject to the substantive provisions
of section 14(d)' 86 because the policy concern of investor protec-
tion is adequately served by imposition of the regulations on the
subsidiary as a bidder. However, the parent company does have
sufficient control to be deemed a beneficial owner.187 The policy
underlying the requirement of informational disclosure concern-
ing controlling persons may be that such a person, although not
directly making a tender offer bid, will nonetheless be in a posi-
tion to influence fundamental decisions of the subject company
upon consummation of the tender offer. These provisions, there-
fore, require the disclosure of information relating to those per-
sons with the presumed ability to alter the risk-return components
of the shareholders' investments, by reason of the tender offer,
through control over the nominal bidder. 88
A controlling creditor, if correctly defined in terms of the abil-
ity to cause a shift in corporate control,8 9 is by definition a con-
trolling person. As with the case of a parent company, the
creditor may be a beneficial owner of the subject company's se-
curities upon successful completion of the tender offer. 190 More-
over, through contractual provisions in the loan contract, the
creditor's relationship to the debtor may approach that of an eq-
This provision may have some relevance for the executives and directors of a controlling
creditor and may require the debtor-bidder to make disclosures concerning their activities
and intentions.
183. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (July 21, 1977), reprinted in [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,256, at 88,374.
184. See notes 110-13, 163-66 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
188. See topic I-C supra.
189. See topic I-C, D supra.
190. See topic II-B supra.
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uity owner, with the resultant ability to indirectly control the ac-
quired subject company.' 9t
This characterization of the policy underpinnings of the "con-
trolling persons" disclosure requirement is supported by the fact
that virtually all information requested of bidders must be given
with respect to controlling persons. The instruction to Schedule
14D-1 specifically enumerates Items 2-7 as information required
about controlling persons. 192 The remaining items of the schedule,
Items 8-11, need not apply to controlling persons because such
information would merely duplicate the bidder's responses to
those items. Item 8 requires disclosure of "persons retained, em-
ployed, or to be compensated" to make recommendations in con-
nection with the tender offer."' The debtor-bidder must identify
all such persons, making it unnecessary for controlling persons to
be compelled to do so. Disclosure of financial information is re-
quired in Item 9 if such information is material to a decision by a
security holder whether to sell, tender, or hold securities being
sought in the tender offer. 194 Such information is requested con-
cerning controlling persons only if the bidder is "not a natural
person and .. . [was] formed for the purpose of making the
tender offer."' 95 The underlying policy here would appear to be
that a controlling person is in a position so remote from the
tendering shareholder's investment decision (even though in indi-
rect control of the subject company) that the burden and cost of
disclosure cannot be justified. The Commission has noted that
the disclosure requirements "should not be so broad as to cause
191. See notes 163-66 supra and accompanying text. See also topic I-D supra.
192. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978). The required information encompasses: identity
and background; past contacts, transactions or negotiations with the subject company;
source and amount of funds or other consideration; purpose of the tender offer and the
bidder's future plans or proposals for the subject company; any existing interest in the
securities of the subject company; and contracts, arrangements, understandings, or rela-
tionships with respect to the subject company securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
Similar disclosures are required in Schedule 13D, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484 (1978) (to be codi-
fied in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I01), which bidders filed prior to the adoption of Schedule
14D-1. See note 77 supra.
193. Schedule 14D-1, Item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
194. Schedule 14D-1, Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978). Schedule 13D did not
require the filing of a financial statement by the bidder. However, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (1976), the general antifraud provision of the Williams Act, requires disclosure of
financial information if it is material. Before Schedule 14D-1 was adopted, it was sug-
gested that "financial information be made available in all cases in which little or no finan-
cial information about the bidder [was] available from other sources." DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 7, at 61.
195. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (July 21, 1977), reprinted in
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. R.EP. (CCH) 1 81,256, at 88,380.
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the benefits of disclosure to be outweighed by the burden of com-
pliance placed on the bidder."' 196
One might argue that, with respect to financial information,
full disclosure is not achieved unless the creditor is found to be a
bidder and required to file its own Schedule 14D-1. Such an as-
sertion can be rebutted by resort to Item 10(f) which states that the
bidder must disclose "such additional material information, if
any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not materially
misleading." 197 If the creditor's financial position would be ma-
terial to an investor's decision, then it must be disclosed. If it is
not, however, then there is no justification for pursuing the disclo-
sure of such information. The Commission has acknowledged
that if a parent company's financial condition is material to an
investor's decision "whether to tender, hold, or sell the securities
being sought in the offer," such information must be disclosed.' 98
Item 10 requires disclosure of additional information, such as
the applicability of margin requirements, antitrust implications,
and any pending legal proceedings relating to the tender offer.' 99
The filing of documents relating to the tender offer, such as the
loan contract, is also required in Item 10.200 As is true with Item
8,201 these provisions deal generally with the circumstances sur-
rounding the tender offer itself. The debtor-bidder has the best
access to such information since it has made the tender offer, and
thus the burden of compliance with these requirements rightfully
rests solely on its shoulders.
One might argue that the information requested in Items 8-11
should be disclosed with respect to controlling persons despite the
apparent restriction of Instruction C.202 The instruction states that
"[a] response to an item in the [tender offer] statement is required
with respect to the bidder and to all other persons referred to in
this instruction unless such item specifies to the contrary."2 °3 Con-
trolling persons are mentioned in Instruction C, and, upon inspec-
tion of the schedule, only Item 9 limits its own application to a
196. Presumably, this applies to others integrally involved in the tender offer process.
Id at 88,374.
197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
198. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,787 (July 21, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,256, at 88,378.
199. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
200. Id
201. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
202. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
203. Schedule 14D-1, Instruction C, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978) (emphasis added).
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subset of controlling persons.2' Several items specifically in-
clude by reference controlling persons within the class of persons
named in Instruction C.205 As a result, the requirements for dis-
closure may extend beyond Items 2-7 and are coextensive with the
requirements for bidder disclosure. On the other hand, the state-
ment probably indicates that all those persons listed in the in-
struction are included in the disclosures unless an item restricts
the disclosure to a subset of those persons. Nevertheless, in terms
of satisfying the policies of section 14(d) as it relates to the con-
trolling creditor, full disclosure is achieved without imposing the
primary responsibility for compliance with section 14(d) upon the
creditor by proving that it is a bidder.20 6
In addition to information requested by certain items directly
concerning the creditor, several of the primary disclosures by the
debtor-bidder concerning its own activities will result in uncover-
ing much information pertinent to the issue of the control relation.
The creditor's involvement in the tender offer transaction will be
described pursuant to Item 4 of Schedule 14D-l, concerning the
source and amount of funds used in purchasing the tendered
shares.207  The identity of banks falling within the definition in
section 3(a)(b) of the Exchange Act2°0 may, however, be kept con-
fidential. Item 4 states in part:
(b) If all or any part of such funds or other consideration
are or are expected to be, directly or indirectly, borrowed for
the purpose of the tender offer.
(1) Provide a summary of each loan agreement or ar-
rangement containing the identity of the parties, the term, the
collateral, the stated and effective interest rates, and other ma-
terial terms or conditions relative to such loan agreement
204. See notes 194-98 supra and accompanying text.
205. See Schedule 14D-1, Items 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
206. A creditor must file a Schedule 13D as a beneficial owner of more than five per-
cent of the subject company's securities pursuant to rule 13d-l(a), 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484,
18,495 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a)). In the tender offer situation,
this information would not be made available to the subject company's shareholders in
time to be useful in making an informed investment decision in response to the debtor-
bidder's tender offer, since rule 13d-l(a) allows up to 10 days after the acquisition for
compliance. The policy concerns of§ 14(d) are not fully satisfied by merely requiring the
creditor to file Schedule 13D. Thus, identifying controlling persons and making suitable
itemized disclosures are important in assuring an adequate atmosphere for informed inves-
tor decisionmaking.
207. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978). Item 3 of Schedule 13D, as recently amended, is
substantially similar to this provision. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,498 (1978) (to be codified in
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101).
208. See notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text.
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209
Furthermore, Item 11 requires that the loan agreement be filed as
an exhibit.210  The disclosure of the loan agreement apprises in-
vestors of the extent of control which the creditor has acquired
through the terms in the loan contract. It also signals the subject
company that it may be possible to attack the tender offer on the
basis of creditor control.
Furthermore, Item 7 requires the disclosure of the bidder's re-
lationship with any other persons with respect to the securities of
the subject company, including the identities of the parties in-
volved and the details of the relationship.21" ' Thus, if the creditor
acquires an economic interest in the subject company's stock
through the loan contract or an understanding, arrangement, or
relationship formed in connection with the financing transaction,
this must be disclosed in the bidder's Schedule 14D-1.21 2
The bidder must disclose the applicability of the margin re-
quirements of section 7 of the Exchange Act to the loan transac-
tion in Item 10 of Schedule 14D-1. 2 13  This provision is relevant
to the controlling creditor since the restrictive covenants which
may give rise to control may also lead to margin requirement vio-
209. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
210. No such requirement previously existed in Schedule 13D. See Griffin & Tucker,
The Williams Act Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect
to the Williams Act, 16 How. L. REv. 654, 678 (1971). Item 7 of Schedule 13D now re-
quires the filing of the loan agreement as an exhibit. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,499 (1978) (to
be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101).
211. Item 7 requires that the bidder.
Describe any contract, arrangement, understanding or relationship (whether or
not legally enforceable) between the bidder (including those persons enumerated
in Instruction C to this schedule) and any person with respect to any securities of
the subject company, (including, but not limited to, any contract, arrangement,
understanding or relationship concerning the transfer or the voting of any of such
securities joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guarantees of
loans, guarantees against loss, or the giving or withholding of proxies) naming the
persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships
have been entered into and giving the material provisions thereof. Include such
information for any of such securities that are pledged or otherwise subject to a
contingency, the occurrence of which would give another person the power to
direct the voting or disposition of such securities, except that disclosure of stan-
dard default and similar provisions contained in loan agreements need not be
included.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978) (emphasis added). The interpretation of the term "simi-
lar" will be relevant to the issue of the disclosure of creditor control if it can be successfully
argued that the contractual provisions which give rise to control are "standard default" or
"similar" provisions.
212. Contracts, arrangements, understandings, or relationships may give rise to the for-
mation of a "group" in some circumstances. Griffin & Tucker, supra note 210, at 674; see
notes 124-36, 174-79 supra and accompanying text.
213. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976); see note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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lations if the creditor is a bank and is indirectly relying on the
subject company stock to secure the loan.214 Prior to the adoption
of Schedule 14D-l, margin requirement violations would be dis-
closed only if their omission in disclosure statements violated sec-
tion 14(e), e.g., nondisclosure of legal proceedings concerning
possible margin requirement violations which might result in the
delay or prohibition of the acquisitions of securities pursuant to a
tender offer.215
If litigation arises concerning the control relation that is estab-
lished, this fact would appear in Item 10 of Schedule 14D-l,
which requires disclosure of any material legal proceeding relat-
ing to the tender offer. Litigation might possibly arise over al-
leged violation of the margin requirements, for example, or, if the
creditor is a national bank, for violation of the provisions of the
National Bank Act.216
B. Consequences of Nondisclosure.
From a technical viewpoint, violations of the itemized disclo-
sure requirements may serve as the basis for an injunctive order in
an attempt to defeat the tender offer.21 7 If characterized as a bid-
der, the creditor could be found in violation of section 14(d) and
rule 14d-l for complete noncompliance. 218  The debtor-bidder's
failure to disclose that the creditor was a participant in the tender
offer may be violative of section 14(e), which states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, not misleading, or
to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices in connection with any tender offer ....
214. See Schwartz & Kelly, Bank Financing of Corporate Acquisitions-The Cash
Tender Offer, 88 BANKING L.J. 99, 101-03 (1971).
215. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 62.
216. If a creditor is a national bank and acquires beneficial ownership of the subject
company's stock, allegations may be raised that it is in violation of the National Bank Act
which prohibits the purchase by a national bank, for its own account, of shares of the stock
of any corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1976). See Amended Complaint, Universal
LeafTobacco Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, No. 76-4313, at 20 (D. Ill., filed Dec. 20, 1976). No
such disclosure requirement exists for a Schedule 13D filing, but the possibility of litigation
which may result in the delay of a tender offer may be a material fact, the omission of
which would violate § 14(e). 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
7, at 69-71.
217. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
218. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-I (1978).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). For a discussion of information to be disclosed pursu-
ant to § 14(e), see DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 56-103.
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This provision ensures that "persons engaged in making ...
tender offers. . . are under an obligation to make full disclosure
of material information to those with whom they deal."220
These same defense effects can be achieved by proving viola-
tions that result from nondisclosure of the creditor as a controlling
person. The bidder's failure to make the required disclosures
concerning the controlling creditor is a violation of the itemized
disclosure requirements of rule 14d-1.221 Since section 14(e) is
much broader than the itemized disclosures required pursuant to
rule 14d-l, then presumably the omission of the information re-
quested in Schedule 14D-1 would be violative of section 14(e) as
well.222 This violation alone might serve as the basis for an in-
junction.223
The creditor violates section 13(d)(1) if it fails to file a Sched-
ule 13D as a beneficial owner of the subject company's securi-
ties.224  Arguably, the creditor is also vicariously liable for the
noncompliance of the debtor-bidder by the operation of section
20(a) which states that:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this title or of any-rule or regula-
tion thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of ac-
225tion.
At the outset, the creditor may be able to avoid liability under this
section by establishing the provided statutory defense. Further-
more, it is not clear exactly how "controlling person" should be
defined in the context of section 20(a).226 One possible view is that
control refers to the ability to direct the management and policies
of a corporation. Under this view, a finding of creditor control
for the purposes of sections 13(d) and 14(d) would seem to subject
the creditor to the potential liabilities under section 20(a) as a con-
220. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, (1968), reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2821.
221. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
222. Section 14(e) is not limited to tender offers that result in the beneficial ownership
of more than five percent of an equity class of securities; it applies to acts and statements
made "in connection with" a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
223. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
224. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
226. See Sommer, Wkho's "in Conroli'-SEC., 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966).
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trolling person. 227 Another possible variation is that the purpose
of section 20(a) is to prevent fraud and that only those persons in a
position to prevent the violation (Le., to compel disclosure) would
be subject to liability for violations by controlled persons.228 Al-
though the creditor may or may not be in a position to compel the
debtor-bidder to disclose, it may be liable nonetheless under sec-
tion 20(a), since it could have prevented the violation by making
the disclosures on its own, and since the omitted information con-
cerned its control relationship with the debtor-bidder.
As a practical matter, therefore, a person seeking to enjoin a
tender offer may be able to attack the bid on the basis of the fi-
nancing arrangement, without encountering the difficulties associ-
ated with showing that the creditor has made a tender offer.
Attacking a tender offer based on allegations of creditor control
involves novel arguments, and by alleging that the creditor is a
bidder, the plaintiff is running the risk of stretching the imagina-
tion of the court too far, to the extent that the entire argument is
dismissed. By avoiding the allegation that the creditor is a bidder,
the plaintiff is more reasonably assured that the attention of the
court will not be distracted by allegations that the creditor has
made a tender offer and that it will focus on what is really at issue:
the allegation of creditor control. The plaintiff can then concen-
trate on the factual arguments in support of the allegation of cred-
itor control-that, by reason of the financing arrangement, the
creditor will "have virtually absolute dominion and control over
[the bidder] and [the subject company] should the tender offer be
successful."' 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The financier of a tender offer who acquires control over the
debtor-bidder or the subject company's securities may be charac-
terized as a bidder if, as a result of the control relation, it has
become a beneficial owner of the subject company's securities and
the tender offer can be construed as being made on its behalf.
The nominal bidder must disclose much about the creditor and
227. See topic I-C supra.
228. Cf. Campbell, Demining Control in Secondary Distributions, 18 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 37 (1976) (control under § 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(I 1) (1976)).
229. Amended Complaint, Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, No.
76-4313, at 12 (D. Ill., filed Dec. 20, 1976); see notes 4, 5 supra and accompanying text.
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the control relation; the creditor must make disclosures, too, due
to its beneficial ownership of the subject company's securities re-
sulting from a successful takeover of the subject company by the
debtor-bidder. In light of the disclosures required of the debtor-
bidder and the creditor, if the creditor is a controlling person and
a beneficial owner of the subject company's securities, both the
creditor and the debtor-bidder will be in violation of the federal
securities laws for nondisclosure of the required information,
making the further allegation that the creditor is a bidder unnec-
essary.
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